ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models, such as [Haile and Tamer, 2003 ], using data on transaction prices from English auctions.
INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the problem of choosing a reserve price using a sample of transaction prices from English auctions with independent private values (IPV). Under a weak behavioral assumption that the winner always obtains a nonnegative surplus as in [Haile and Tamer, 2003 ] (HT), the paper proposes a decision rule that selects a single reserve price following the framework of [Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 ] (GS). [Paarsch, 1997] employs the button auction model, which regards observed bids as latent values, to point identify the valuation distribution and Date: January 21, 2012.
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then chooses a revenue maximizing reserve price (RMRP) implied by the estimated valuation distribution. 1 Many English auctions, however, impose a minimum bid increment, and often bidders raise the price by more than the minimum bid increment (jump bidding), thereby invalidating this identifying assumption. 2 As a result, using this assumption may lead to a severely incorrect inference; see HT.
HT employs an incomplete model instead, only assuming that the bidders neither overbid their values nor let the auction terminate at a price they can profitably overbid. For this partially identified model, HT proposes a set estimator for the RMRP (the HT interval). This approach is robust to any misspecification of bidding behavior. But, the HT interval does not provide a practical guidance for the seller to choose a single reserve price because a significant fraction of the interval can be less profitable than zero reserve price (34-52% ; Table 1 ).
To solve the seller's problem, this paper, while using the incomplete model, chooses a single reserve price employing the maxmin expected utility framework of GS, thereby complementing HT. GS extends the classic expected utility theory to allow the decision maker to have many equally reasonable distributions over the random vector that affects the payoff. GS shows that if he is uncertainty averse, he behaves as if he maximizes the lower envelop of the equally reasonable expected utilities. 3 Maxmin criteria provides a robust framework to select an optimal policy for partially identified models;
see [Song, 2010; Kitagawa, 2010 Kitagawa, , 2011 Menzel, 2011] for recent applications.
To formulate the seller's problem within this framework, the paper considers the parameter vector that indexes the valuation distribution as the random vector that affects the revenue. The paper then divides the parameters into two groups: identified and unidentified. The former indexes the density of the transaction price and the latter captures any discrepancy between the densities of the transaction price and the highest values. 4 The 1 Following the convention in the literature, the term 'revenue' refers to the seller's expected revenue where the expectation taken with respect to the values density.
2 There does not exist an equilibrium with jump bidding under assumptions reasonable in many auction settings [Lellouche and Romm, 2009] . Uncertainty aversion means a decision maker prefers known risks to unknown risks. 4 Within the setting of [Paarsch, 1997] , there would be no need for the second group as the two densities would be the same.
seller is assumed to have a unique prior distribution over the identified parameters, but many reasonable priors over the unidentified ones, where a prior is said to be 'reasonable' if it does not contradict the only behavioral assumption -the transaction price does not exceed the highest value. Although each of these priors conveys different information about bidding behavior, if the seller regards them as equally reasonable, then he should maximize the lower envelop of posterior expectations of revenues. This paper shows that the lower envelop is achieved by the prior equating the densities of the transaction price and the highest value. This follows from observing that the transaction price distribution is first order stochastically dominated by every highest valuation distribution that is supported by at least one of the reasonable priors. The former then gives the greatest lower bound for the stochastic dominance relation of the marginal distributions of independent value, providing the smallest revenue at every reserve price. Therefore, the method interprets the transaction price as the highest value and implements the classic expected utility framework. Furthermore, the method remains optimal for correlated values under the assumption of [Aradillas-López, Gandhi, and Quint, 2011] that the sample of transaction price identifies the distribution of the second highest values.
The next section describes the seller's problem and section 3 develops an optimal decision rule. Section 4 illustrates typical revenue gains over average revenues of the HT interval via Monte Carlo experiments. Section 5 concludes and an appendix collects all computational details.
AUCTION MODELS
A single indivisible object is auctioned among m ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders in an English auction. Each bidder i observes only his values v i ≥ 0. Assume v 1 , . . . , v m are drawn independently from an identical, absolutely continuous distribution P v with density p v . 5 The auction starts at zero price and at each time bidders raise the standing priceỹ by at least ∆, the minimum bid increment. Bidding more thanỹ + ∆ is known as jump bidding.
5 Throughout the paper, the upper (lower) case letter denotes the cdf (pdf).
When no bidder is willing to raiseỹ further, the auction allocates the object to the bidder who offers the final bid at the transaction price y :=ỹ.
Following HT, this paper makes the assumption:
This assumption is weaker than the assumptions in HT, which also requires that the bidders do not let their opponents win at a price they can overbid. The data z T available to the seller consists of i.i.d transaction prices (y 1 , . . . , y T ) from past T auctions, each with m bidders. Now, consider a seller with data z T who wishes to choose a reserve price to maximize his revenue in a future auction. The future auction can take any of the 'standard' auctions where a bidder with zero value expects to pay zero. 6 The valuation distribution remains unchanged and the seller's values for the object is zero. [Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981] show that the reserve price ρ that maximizes the revenue
solves the following first order necessary condition
Since the seller does not know P v , he cannot use (2) to determine ρ. For this problem, [Paarsch, 1997] proposes to estimate P v by treating the observed bids as losers values in the button auction model, and use the point estimates in (2) instead of P v (a.k.a. 'plug-in' method). 7 When ∆ > 0 or there is jump bidding, however, the assumption that bids equal values can be unreasonable. HT shows that this assumption can cause a significant bias in the estimation of P v even for a correctly specified parametric model.
For this reason, HT only assumes that bidders do not overbid their value and do not let the auction terminate at a price that they can profitably overbid. Then, HT partially identifies P v and constructs a set estimator for the RMRP. These set estimates are robust to any misspecification on bidding behavior with jump bidding and ∆ > 0. The HT interval itself, however, does not completely solve the seller's problem. Moreover, the HT interval includes many reserve prices with revenue lower than with zero reserve price. Table 1 shows that such reserve prices are about 34% to 52% of the HT intervals, each of which is obtained from bid samples of 200 auctions generated from a fixed data generating processes (DGP), i.e., a combination of a valuation distribution in Figures 1 and 2 and m ∈ {3, 5} bidders. 8 In most cases, zero reserve price produces substantially higher revenues than average revenues of the HT intervals, see Table 2 . This stems from the asymmetric shape of the revenue function.
The revenue gradually increases up to the RMRP, marked in the figures, but it drops sharply thereafter, while the upper limit of the HT interval is much higher than the RMRP.
What should then be the criteria to choose a single reserve price? The next section proposes a solution.
Γ MAXMIN SOLUTION
This section develops an optimal point decision rule for the seller. The optimality is associated with the seller's preference ordering. The paper assumes that
Assumption 2. (A-GS) The seller satisfies the axioms (A.1-A.6) in GS.
(A-GS) coincides with assumptions in the classic expected utility theory, except it allows the seller to weakly prefers any convex combination of indifferent lotteries to each individual one instead of restricting the combination to be indifferent-uncertainty aversion.
9
This section develops the decision rule for auctions with the IPV and further argues that the rule remains optimal even when values are correlated if the distribution of the second highest value is identified.
8 Section 4 explains each DGP's in detail. 9 One interpretation of this is that the decision maker prefers to secure himself against a potential loss from a particular risky asset by spreading the risk over the indifferent assets (as in a portfolio management).
Independent Private Values:
Let θ ∈ Θ index the distribution of the transaction price y, and h ∈ H capture any discrepancy between the distributions of x and y. Since P x (x|θ, h) = P m v (x|θ, h), the paper specifies the cdf of y as
to make them comparable.
The seller has only three sources of information: the data z T , (A-HT) and his subjective beliefs about θ represented by the prior p θ over Θ. Consider, however, a hypothetical situation in which he also has a conditional prior
In such a situation, [Kim, 2012] posits choosing a reserve price as the seller's decision problem under parameter uncertainty. 10 The paper shows that if the seller behaves rationally in the sense of [Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963] , he would maximize the expected revenue given by
where the posterior density can be obtained via Bayes theorem [Kim, 2012] discusses the optimality of this Bayesian approach from the frequentist perspective, and shows that it can produce substantially higher revenues than the plug-in rule.
When h is not identified, however, this approach can be sensitive to the choice of the conditional prior p h (·|θ)-since (5) can be written as
The plug-in approach does not consider the parameter uncertainty because it regards the point estimate of the valuation distribution as the true distribution. Then, under this hypothesis, the plug-in approach 'certainly' maximizes the seller's revenue. the impact of p h (·|θ) on the solution to maximize (4) does not disappear even when T is large. Prior to HT, the literature had employed the button auction model, which can be viewed as a strong prior that equates the distributions of x and y. As HT shows, such an assumption can lead to a misleading inference, when there is jump bidding or ∆ > 0. Even though an econometrician can employ a less informative prior in a hope of using weaker assumptions, it would still bear some information about unverifiable bidding behavior. This paper instead considers a convex set Γ of reasonable conditional priors on h given θ and assumes that the seller regards all the elements in Γ as equally reasonable. A conditional prior p h (·|θ) is said to be reasonable if it conforms to (A-HT) for every θ ∈ Θ. Formally, Γ is a set of all
GS shows that it is optimal for the seller to solve
That is, a seller should choose a reserve price that maximizes the revenue in (4) with respect to the most pessimistic prior in Γ.
Definition 1. A decision rule that solves (7) for every realization of z T is called the Γ maxmin rule.
This framework is particularly useful for the partially identified auction model because its policy recommendation is robust to the choice of priors over the unidentified parameter h. Solving (7) is, however, computationally expensive because the 'min' part solves an optimization problem over a space of high dimensional functions for every ρ considered for the maximization problem.
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The central result of this paper is that this issue does not arise for the seller's problem. The following proposition establishes that a probability 11 [Chamberlain, 2000] proposes a computation algorithm for a similar problem, but with a simple utility function.
mass function degenerated at h = 0, denoted by δ 0 , solves the minimization problem.
Proposition 1.
Under (A-HT) and (A-GS),
Proof. Consider any (θ, h) ∈ Θ × H for which there is some p h ∈ Γ such that
These inequalities then imply u(θ, h, ρ) ≥ u(θ, 0, ρ) (see (1)) and hence Let the bidders private values (v 1 , . . . , v m ) be distributed as P v (·, . . . , ·|θ, h). Now, the distributions of the highest and second-highest values are not necessarily linked through the identical marginal valuation distribution, in par-
which is more general than (1). Under (A-AGQ), z T point identifies P y (·|θ), but not P x (·|θ, h). Hence, (9) can only be partially identified; see [AradillasLópez, Gandhi, and Quint, 2011] . In particular, it is bounded below by u(θ, 0, ρ). Now, consider the Γ with property (6). Then, it is straightforward to show that the seller would also solve (8) with the revenue (9) as formalized below.
Proposition 2. When the value are correlated, under (A-GS) and (A-AGQ), (8) holds true for the revenue defined in (9).
COMPARISONS BETWEEN Γ-MAXMIN & HAILE AND TAMER
This section compares performances of the Γ-maxmin rule with the average revenues associated with the HT interval for four valuation densities in Figures 1 and 2 , which also show the associated revenue functions for for bidders m = 3, 4, 5. Figure 1 is associated with the density similar to an exponential distribution as well as the long-tailed density. 12 Similarly, Figure 2 is associated with lognormal densities with alternative parameters. 13 Then, for each of these valuation densities, the experiments consider T ∈ {100, 200} sample sizes and m ∈ {3, 5} bidders, leading to a total of 16 experiments. Each experiment, i.e., each triplet of (values density, T, m), conducts 1,000 Monte Carlo replications.
For each experiment, the seller selects a bidder randomly and uses ∆ỹ := 0.05 ×ỹ as the minimum bid increment rule. The chosen bidder bids exactlyỹ + ∆ỹ, as long as it is less than his value. Each replication uses only transaction prices to implement the Γ maxmin approach, but uses all bids to implement the HT approach for a comparison with the tightest HT interval.
Then the corresponding revenues are computed, where the revenue under HT is defined to be the average revenue across the interval. Note that HT does not propose any particular method to choose the reserve price from the interval.
12 These densities have the form of (10) 13 The lognormal distributions with (µ, σ) = (3, 1) and (4,1/2) are truncated at the 99-th percentile and rescaled so that their supports are the unit interval. HT employs the lognormal densities that appear in Figure 2 for Monte Carlo studies.
The section reports the average percentage gain of the Γ-maxmin rule over the HT interval. The experiments specify the distribution of the transaction price using the Bernstein cdf:
where θ ∈ ∆ k−1 , the k − 1 dimensional unit simplex, i.e., θ j ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ∑ k−1 j=1 θ j ≤ 1, and Beta(·|a, b) denotes the beta cdf with parameters a and b; see [Petrone, 1999a,b] for a nonparametric Bayesian method that uses (10). This paper employs the model with k = 15 with the uniform prior over ∆ 14 . 
CONCLUSION
The literature, since [Paarsch, 1997] , has proposed various procedures to determine a reserve price for the revenue maximizing seller of an auction. In particular, for the English auction, the exact procedure depends on the type of data (all bids vs only transaction prices) and on the behavioral assumptions (button auction model vs. incomplete models). All of these procedures except Kim [2012] , however, view the seller's decision problem as essentially an estimation problem: estimate the valuation distribution, use these estimates to obtain the RMRP, and study asymptotic properties of the estimates (either a point or a set). Extending the formal Bayesian decision method of Kim [2012] , and using GS this paper proposes a solution to choose a single reserve price for an English auction with partially identified valuation distribution. This paper shows that it is optimal to employ the Bayesian method interpreting the transaction prices as the highest values.
APPENDIX A. COMPUTATION
Each Monte Carlo experiment obtains a sample θ 1 , . . . , θ S from posterior distribution using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. For this initial step, a flat prior over ∆ k−1 and a sample z 1 T is employed for constructing the posterior. Each replication conducts all the inference applying the importance sampling method to (θ 1 , . . . , θ S ), the prior for the experiment, and a new sample z l n from the given DGP. This section illustrates computational details.
A.1. Sampling from the Posterior with a flat prior. For each pair of (P v , m) and for the first Monte Carlo replication, The Metropolis Hastings algorithm draws random parameters from the posterior with the sample z 1 T and the prior given by p(θ) = ∏ k j=1 p j (θ j ) with p j (θ) ∝ 1 for j = 1, . . . , k. Let θ s denote the s-th sample from the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
For the experiments with the exponential-like and the long-tailed densities, The true parameter value is used as the initial value for the algorithm, and for the log-normal like densities, a vector of 1/k is used for the initial value. Then, at the s-th Metropolis Hastings step, the algorithm updates θ s component by component from j = 1 to k. Let θ j,s := (θ s 1 , . . . , θ s j−1 , θ s−1 j , . . . , θ s−1 k ). Then, the algorithm draws a candidtateθ j ∼ q j (·|θ j,s ), the proposal density for the j-th component of θ. Letθ j,s := (θ s 1 , . . . , θ s j−1 ,θ j , θ s−1 j+1 , . . . , θ s−1 k ), and set θ s j =θ j with probability
and θ s j = θ s−1 j , otherwise. For each k, we iterate the algorithm 200, 000 times recording every 200-th iteration. Among these 2,000 draws, we employ the last 1,000 for the implementation of the decision rules (S = 1, 000).
A.2. Proposal density. For the proposal density q j , we employ a Gaussian density with mean θ s−1 j and variance σ 2 j that is truncated so thatθ j,s belongs to ∆ k−1 . Then,θ j ∈ [0,θ j ] where the upper forθ j is given bȳ
Then, q j has the form of
The inverse CDF method drawsθ j from (12). Moreover, since p j (·) ∝ 1 for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1 and φ(·) is symmetric about zero, (11) simplifies
The algorithm uses σ j = 1.54 for s ≤ 20 and σ j = 1.54 × stdev θ 1 j , θ 1 j , . . . , θ s * j for s > 20 with s * := min(s, 0.4 × S). This adaptive method is similar to Haario, Saksman, and Tamminen [2005] .
A.3. Replication 2 to 1,000: Importance Sampling. This paper approximates the posterior mean of the revenue (15) or (17) using the importance sampling. Each l-th Monte Carlo replication constructs the importance weight
approximates the Bayes action bŷ
where
A.4. Revenue Approximation. The seller's revenue in (1) can be written as
The trapezoid rule approximates all the integrals of (15) using the J = 1, 001 equidistant reference points on the unit interval, x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 1001 with x j = j/1000. Let A := x j 1,000 j=0
, the set of all feasible reserve price. With a slight abuse of notation, f and F denotes J dimensional vector of the pdf and cdf of the values density evaluated at each x j ∈ A, respectively. For this purpose, many statistical softwares (e.g., Matlab) evaluate the pdf and the cdf for the beta distribution and the (log)normal distribution. LetÃ := (ã 1 , . . . ,ã J ) withã j := 0 if j = 1, and otherwisẽ 
approximates the revenue (15) at each x j ∈ A under the values density f . The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices chosen by the Γ-minmax (heavy). The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices chosen by the Γ-minmax (heavy). The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices chosen by the Γ-minmax (heavy). The revenue function is plotted along with the distributions of the lower and the upper bounds for the HT set (light lines) and the reserve prices chosen by the Γ-minmax (heavy).
